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Abstract: The first ‘regular’ transfer of power between two civilian governments in Pakistan 
manifested itself in the aftermath of the 2013 general elections. Many celebrated this shift as 
a positive sign of democratic consolidation. However, the appreciation of this allegedly ‘new 
democratic wave’ ignores the resilience of decade-old authoritarian, and anti-democratic 
patterns. The military still dominates all significant political decision-making processes. 
Furthermore, with the 21st constitutional amendment the soldiers were able to further 
entrench their formal role in the political-institutional setup. This seriously challenges the 
notions of civilian supremacy, which is unfortunate, since civilian control of the armed forces 
is a necessary constituent for democracy and democratic consolidation. 
Keywords:  Pakistan, Army, Constitution, Amendment, Civil-Military Relations.   
 
The complexity of the challenges in the process of state- and institution-building in a 
decolonized context tends to reduce the distance between military and civilian realms in 
numerous young Asian states, especially in Pakistan
1
.  Here, the inherited British colonial 
notion of civilian supremacy over the armed forces and the soldiers’ aloofness from the 
political sphere
2
 underwent a gradual but significant changes leading to various regime-types 
oscillating between military dictatorship and elected political authoritarianism after 
independence
3
. In this context and over the time, Pakistan was considered as a potentially 
classic example of a praetorian state
4
 in which the Army perceives itself as the sole guardian 
of the country’s national sovereignty and physical, political and moral integrity, the chief 
initiator of the national agenda and the major arbiter of conflict between social and political 
forces
5
. In order to maintain this role, the military developed a critical outlook on its corporate 
interests prioritizing the achievement of its goals independent from the ‘disappointing’ 
civilian (political) sphere
6
. This phenomenon was exemplified in the initial years after the 
country’s independence through modernization including procurement of arms and equipment 
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or sophisticated training based on the military autonomous decision
7
. This happened not only 
through the consumption of a relatively extraordinary, disproportionate amount of national 
resources but also on the expense on civilian supremacy. This process got enhanced due to 
domestic political turmoil and a remarkable external threat perception in the initial years 
(which is actually enduring until today), a lack of (elected) civilian leadership, and an 
unfortunate alliance between the country’s ruling bureaucracy and the armed forces8.  
 
According to many observers, the development of the political system became characterised 
by a lack of institutionalization and chronic instability while the army grew in strength and 
size over time
9
. This created an imbalance of power, favouring the armed forces and, 
simultaneously, further weakened civilian power in the political decision-making process. 
Subsequently, the army established itself as the most dominant actor in the business of the 
state, namely in the form of direct and indirect military intervention able to gain control over 
all significant decision making areas
10
. Therefore, Pakistan must be perceived as a case of 
failed civilian control. This is unfortunate, since civilian control of the armed forces is a 
necessary constituent for democracy and democratic consolidation
11
. Therefore, it does not 
come by surprise that Pakistan does not fit into the story of a global triumph of 
democratization. 
 
Also, in the beginning of 2015 another unfortunate episode took place in Pakistan’s truncated 
political history. Once again, one could hear the momentous military rhetoric of the ‘doctrine 
of necessity’12 in order to justify direct intervention into the country’s politics to establish 
formal prerogatives and an institutionally ensured role for the military. Institutionalized 
prerogatives describe formal rights by which the armed forces are able ‘to exercise effective 
control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within the state 
apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or social society’13. 
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On January 6th, the National Assembly and the Senate unopposed approved the 21st 
Constitutional Amendment Bill and Pakistan Army Act 1952 (Amendment) Bill 2015
14
. 
These laws will provide constitutional cover for extending the jurisdiction to military courts 
for the trial of terrorism suspects.  
 
The 21st amendment to the Constitution also provides for entering the Pakistan Army Act 
1952, the Pakistan Army Act 1953, the Pakistan Navy Act 1961 and the Protection of 
Pakistan Act, 2014 in the first schedule of the Constitution. The first schedule of the 
Constitution contains laws which are exempted from the application of Article 8 (1) and (2) of 
the Constitution. These articles are part of Chapter 1 of the Constitution relating to the 
fundamental rights
15
. More concrete, the 21
st
 Amendment Act provides for the creation of 
military speed trial courts (STCs) for offences relating to terrorism, waging war against 
Pakistan and prevention of acts threatening the security of the country. The Act shall remain 
in force for two years starting January 7, 2015 after the President signed the Act
16
. 
Unsurprisingly, the decision to enforce the legal framework was publicly portrayed as a 
political response to the atrocious Peshawar school massacre and the Waqar border blast (both 
end of last year), in which hundreds of people were murdered or severely wounded by 
terrorists
17
.  
 
Although terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism needs to be combatted fervently –about 
56,000 people died in terrorism-related incidents in Pakistan over the past decade
18
 - the latest 
constitutional amendment gives reason to worry. Several leading oppositional politicians, 
lawyers, human rights activists, and political analysts have expressed their opposition to the 
new, special military courts
19
. There are several reasons for this: 
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First, the 21st Amendment determines a significant transfer of power to armed forces’ 
authorities. Especially the fact that civilians can be subjected to military jurisdiction is a major 
cause of concern. It is not quite clear if the proposed special tribunals will function under the 
supervision of the country’s highest courts or if there will be any effective parliamentary 
oversight. In this regard, one should mention that it is a generally accepted international 
principle that military courts should have no juridical clout over civilians
20
. In other words, 
the judicial system must ensure that civilians accused of a criminal offence of any nature, 
including terrorism, are brought to justice by civilian courts. Military courts in many countries 
do not have a good reputation or record of offering a fair judicial system, especially regarding 
human rights and fundamental principles of justice
21
. 
 
Second, many observers are concerned about the clause that the federal government can 
transfer any case pending in any trial court to military courts
22
. Taking the real composition of 
Pakistan’s power structures into account, one has to be aware that this paves the way for 
military dominance in judicial affairs and it also reduces the significance of all higher 
(civilian) courts
23
. In addition, the new bill does not mention the right of convicted subjects to 
appeal decisions in civilian courts
24
. This creates a severe distortion of the separation of 
powers and undermines the basic structure of the constitution by giving an extraordinary 
judicial mandate to an executive agent. Furthermore, it deepens the rift between the judiciary 
and legislature
25
. In sum, the new legal framework will lead to a further destabilisation of the 
country’s political institutions/ institutional framework. 
 
Third, military justice without transparency and oversight, is seriously undermining the 
democratic process in Pakistan, which lacks any experience and tradition of consolidating 
political institutions like civilian control. Therefore, the 21st Amendment is not only 
indicative for the willingness of the army’s top brass to direct the political process openly but 
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also that the country is once under the auspices of military rule. Here, one has  consider the 
fact that the latest constitutional engineering bolsters the already existing informal dominance 
of the armed forces through the manifestation of the strongest formal institutional role for the 
military in Pakistan’s political decision making process ever. The handing over of more 
power to an institution which has undermined and changed the Constitution several times in 
the past is more than just an act of negligence. The 21st Amendment can be equated to the 
surrender of any democratic achievements and further widens the path of deeply entrenched 
authoritarian tendencies. 
 
Fourth, the history as well as contemporary politics shows that Pakistan’s security circles 
have a quite idiosyncratic definition of terrorism, which is not necessarily in line with the 
common understanding of this phenomenon. Subsequently, fears exist that the trials will not 
only be used against terrorism but also against political opposition, critical media, or 
separatist groups, especially in the Balochistan province
26
.  
 
Taking the genesis of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism into account, it is also naïve to 
think that Pakistan’s public safety will improve or be guaranteed with the setup of military 
courts. Furthermore, the argument put forth that military courts are more capable of protecting 
the life and integrity of judges. Additionally, witnesses must be put in perspective with view 
on the high profile attacks on military installations and the undermining of Pakistan’s armed 
forces by Islamic fundamentalist protagonists in the last years. This move is yet another 
example for the dysfunctional political system as well as the incompetence and unwillingness 
of the civilian part of the country’s so called ‘establishment’ to deal with the tremendous 
challenges the country has to face. In contrast, it is obvious for many international counter-
terrorists experts that Pakistan’s security forces have nurtured many terrorist groups on the 
country’s soil for a long time, particularly in the loosely-controlled tribal areas in the north-
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west bordering Afghanistan. Subsequently, civilians were neither willing to agree on how to 
deal with the militants
27
 nor did they have the sufficient decision-making power and 
competence to implement a coherent and consequent counter-terrorist strategy. Therefore, it 
would be a misinterpretation to proclaim that civilians were completely coerced into 
accepting special military courts. It is rather the often observed unwillingness of the civilian 
leadership and political class to tackle militancy and fundamentalism and thus to secure the 
safety of its people. The military is once again in charge and the civilians are out; yet another 
example for shifting of responsibilities at the cost of democratic institutions. There was and 
still is enough time and freedom for civilians to manoeuvre in order to carry out necessary 
substantial reforms to improve the judicial criminal system. Ultimately, it is also noteworthy 
that the 21st Amendment, even if it might look like it, is not just a short-sighted knee-jerk 
response
28
 or ‘extraordinary measure for an extraordinary situation’ by civilians29, quite the 
contrary. It resembles a well-planned, gradual strategy intended to build up a formal role of 
the military in the country’s political landscape. Some people would call it a ‘constitutional 
coup’ or as “a monument to the betrayal of the civilian, democratic cause”30. 
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